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Abstract—Secure transmission between two agents, Alice and
Bob, over block fading channels can be achieved similarly to
conventional hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) by letting
Alice transmit multiple blocks, each containing an encoded
version of the secret message, until Bob informs Alice about
successful decoding by a public error-free return channel. In
existing literature each block is a differently punctured version
of a single codeword generated with a Wyner code that uses
a common randomness for all blocks. In this paper instead we
propose a more general approach where multiple codewords are
generated from independent randomnesses. The class of channels
for which decodability and secrecy is ensured is characterized,
with derivations for the existence of secret codes. We show in
particular that the classes are not a trivial subset (or superset)
of those of existing schemes, thus highlighting the novelty of the
proposed solution. The result is further confirmed by deriving the
average achievable secrecy throughput, thus taking into account
both decoding and secrecy outage.
Index Terms—Hybrid automatic repeat request, Physical Layer
Security, Secret Message Transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer secrecy has gained a lot of attention in the last
few years, due to its ability of providing information theoretic
unconditional security, thus adding security at the physical
layer. From the seminal works [1]–[3] performance limits and
achievable rates have been derived in different scenarios for
the reliable yet secret transmission of confidential information
(see, e.g. [4] for a review). In particular, it has been shown
that diversity, in the form of fading (temporal diversity),
multipath (frequency diversity) or multiple input multiple
output (MIMO) (spatial diversity) is definitely beneficial to
secret transmission. In fact, dimensions or instants in which
the legitimate receiver is at an advantage with respect to the
eavesdropper can be selected, even if the channels to both
receivers have the same statistics. However, one of the main
obstacles to the effective implementation of such systems is
the need of knowing channel state information (CSI) towards
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper at the time
of code design.
This drawback can be partly mitigated by the presence of
a feedback channel, even with a limited rate and/or publicly
accessible, which, contrary to the unconstrained transmis-
sion case, has been shown to increase secrecy capacity [5].
The automatic repeat request (ARQ) mechanism, with its
intrinsic one-bit feedback is leveraged in [6] for the secure
generation of cryptographic keys, that can either be used
in traditional encryption systems or provide perfect secrecy
through one-time-pad schemes. Instead of considering a simple
retransmission approach, a hybrid automatic repeat request
(HARQ)-like scheme is derived in [7] for secure communi-
cations over a block-fading Gaussian channel. In this case,
a single codeword is generated and punctured versions of
it are transmitted until the legitimate receiver decodes the
secret message. For encoding, a wiretap code with incremental
redundancy is employed, obtaining an incremental redundancy
HARQ (IR-HARQ) scheme, and an outage formulation is
considered. The approach of [7] is then extended in [8]
to a multiuser uplink scenario, with each user aiming at
transmitting a combination of public and confidential messages
to a single base station, with the other users acting potentially
as eavesdroppers. A suboptimal strategy of power allocation
and scheduling to maximize the overall network utility is then
derived. The HARQ secrecy scenario is also considered in [9]
with a rather different approach, where standard codes are used
with the addition of scrambling, but secrecy is expressed in
terms of the bit error probability at the eavesdropper. Lastly,
the throughput of HARQ without secrecy constraints has been
studied in [10], but the analysis does not fit immediately the
different scenario where a secret message must be transmitted.
In this paper we consider a scenario similar to IR-HARQ
of [7], where transmissions occur on block fading channels.
While for IR-HARQ at each retransmission a different punc-
turing of a single codeword of a Wyner code is used, we
propose to encode the secret message with multiple codes and
then send punctured versions of the multiple codewords until
Bob decodes. The obtained solution is denoted secure HARQ
(S-HARQ), and is a strict generalization of IR-HARQ. We
prove the existence of codes that ensure both decodability and
secrecy for all channel realizations that satisfy certain condi-
tions. While decodability and secrecy in IR-HARQ depend
on the average over all channel realization of the mutual
information between the transmitted and received messages, in
S-HARQ instead performance depends on multiple averages
over different fading blocks, thus providing additional degrees
of freedom1.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the scenario of Fig. 1, where an agent Alice
transmits a secret message M to an intended destination agent,
1Notation, throughout the paper EX [g(X)] denotes the expectation of
g(X) with respect to X , and I(X; Y ) denotes the mutual information between
X and Y .
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Fig. 1. System Model.
Bob, over the Alice-Bob channel. A third agent, Eve, overhears
the message transmitted by Alice over an independent Alice-
Eve channel.
Time is organized in consecutive slots of the same du-
ration, which are grouped into frames, each comprising M
consecutive slots. The transmission of M spans in general
many slots. At slot m of frame k, Alice transmits message
Xnk,m of n symbols containing an encoded version of the
secret message. The secret message M bears nRs bits of
information. At each slot, after Alice’s transmission, Bob sends
a not acknowledge (NACK) message if he fails to correctly
decode the secret message. When decoding is successful, Bob
sends an acknowledge (ACK) feedback to Alice, who stops
transmissions. After MK slots used for the transmission of
the same secret message, Alice discards the secret message,
irrespective of Bob decoding outcome. ACK/NACK messages
are perfectly received by Eve. The procedure is similar to
HARQ, except for the presence of Eve, thus we denote the
resulting scheme as S-HARQ.
The message received by Bob at slot m of frame k is
denoted by Y nk,m, which is related to Xnk,m by a given
transition probability distribution. Let us also define XnMk =
[Xnk,1, . . . , X
n
k,M ] and Y nMk = [Y nk,1, . . . , Y nk,M ]. Eve over-
hears the packet Znk,m at slot m of frame k, and let us
define ZnMk = [Znk,1, . . . , Znk,M ]. Both Bob and Eve use all
previously received packets for decoding purposes. Moreover,
Eve knows the encoding procedure followed by Alice.
We assume a block-fading channel, i.e., the channels do
not change within each slot, while they vary from slot to slot.
We also assume that the number of channel uses n within
each slot is large enough so that we can use random cod-
ing arguments. For the Alice-Bob channel {p(Yk,m|Xk,m)}
denotes the symbol transition probability for slot m =
1, 2, . . . ,M , and frame k = 1, 2, . . . ,K . Similarly for the
Alice-Eve channel we have {p(Zk,m|Xk,m)}. Let pm,k =
{p(Yk,m|Xk,m), p(Zk,m|Xk,m)} denote a generic channel re-
alization for slot m and frame k, while pk = {pm,k, m =
1, 2, . . . ,M} is a set of channel realizations in frame k and
p = {pm,k, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K} (1)
denotes a generic channel realization for the whole sequence of
frames. Fading implies that p is a random vector, and block
fading statistics dictates the statistics of the vector. We also
assume that CSI is not available to Alice before transmission.
III. CODE CONSTRUCTION
Encoding aims at ensuring both decodability of M by Bob,
and secrecy, i.e., preventing information leakage to Eve. To
this end Alice encodes the secret message by using a random
binning approach, independently (in the random message) for
each frame. The random message used at frame k to confuse
Eve is denoted as Md,k and bears nRd,k bits of information.
The random message is independently generated at each frame,
contains no secret information and may even be completely
irrelevant for the three agents, since its purpose is only to
confuse Eve about M. We denote the collection of the random
messages over the K frames as Me = {Md,1, . . . ,Md,K}.
Encoding process: Let i ∈ be the index of the (random)
secret message M in the set of 2nRs messages. The encoding
process works as follows: at frame k, Alice selects an index
jk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nRd,k} randomly and uniformly, and gener-
ates the codeword XnMk (i, jk), which is punctured into M
codewords of n symbols Xnk,1(i, jk), . . . , Xnk,M (i, jk). Then,
the punctured codeword Xnk,m(i, jk) is transmitted at the m-th
slot of frame k. The set of transmitted messages over all K
frames is identified by the (K + 1)−ple (i, j1, . . . , jK).
Decoding strategy: We consider a joint typicality decoder
for both Bob and Eve. For the generic slot m of frame k,
let T nk,m,ǫ(XY ) denote the set of all ǫ-jointly weakly typical
sequences ({Xn1,1(i, j1), . . . , Xnk,m(i, jk)}, {Y n1,1, . . . , Y nk,m}).
Bob decides for message (ˆı, ˆ1, . . . , ˆk) if {Xn·,·(ˆı, ˆk)} is the
only sequence taken from Cn that is ǫ-jointly typical with
{Y n·,·}. Otherwise an error is output.
The code used at each frame is called frame code, while
HARQ code denotes the sequence of the frame codes. In
particular:
frame code: this is a subset Cn,k of 2n(Rs+Rd,k) words
of nM symbols, randomly chosen. In fact, for each index pair
(a, b), a ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRs}, b ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRd,k} we choose the
word XnMk (a, b) with independent symbols all drawn from a
same distribution pXk(·);
HARQ code: this is the set of 2n(Rs+
∑K
k=1
Rd,k)
codewords obtained by concatenating the K words
XnKM (a, b1, . . . , bK) = [X
nM
1 (a, b1), . . . , X
nM
K (a, bK)]
and is denoted by Cn.
We also denote the set of all possible codes that can be
generated for frame k as the ensemble Cn,k = {Cn,k}, and
that of all possible HARQ codes as Cn = {Cn}. We assume
that the actually selected code (as well as the ensemble) is
known to both Bob and Eve.
Note that in the case of a single frame (K = 1) we
obtain the scenario considered in [7], where a single codeword
is split into M parts that are sequentially transmitted until
Bob decodes. On the other hand, when M = 1 we have
that a new codeword, generated by an independent random
message, is transmitted at each slot. Other cases (K > 1
and M > 1) correspond to intermediate situations where
each random message spans multiple slots, and more than one
random message may be used to confuse the eavesdropper
about the same secret message, provided that Bob needs more
retransmissions. In the following we detail the general case
for any value of K and M .
IV. DECODABILITY AND SECRECY CONDITIONS
The design of the S-HARQ code aims at ensuring that
a) Bob is able to decode the secret message with vanishing
probability (decodability), and b) Eve gets vanishing informa-
tion rate on the secret message (secrecy). Now we show that
asymptotically (n → ∞) for a given set P of channels, and
for a given set of rates (Rs, Rd,1, . . . , Rd,K), there exists a
S-HARQ code that provides both decodability and secrecy.
Note that the code to be used is the same for all channels in
the set P . In the considered scenario, no CSI is available to
Alice, therefore if the channel is not in P we may have an
outage event, i.e., either Bob may not decode M or Eve may
get some information on M. The outage probability Pout is
the probability that an outage event occurs. From the definition
of set P we have a bound on Pout as
Pout ≤ P[p /∈ P ] , (2)
where P[·] denotes the probability operator. The characteriza-
tion of the set P can then guide the code design and its usage,
since we can obtain an estimate of the outage probability by
assessing the probability that the channel over which the code
is actually used is outside P .
In order to characterize P we first derive conditions on the
realization p that ensure decodability by Bob on average over
a set of codes, then we derive conditions on p that ensure
secrecy with respect to Eve on average over a set of codes.
Finally we characterize the set P over which a single code
provides both secrecy and decodability.
From now on, for the sake of compactness we denote by
IBk,m(pk,m) = limn→∞
1
n
I(Xnk,m;Y
n
k,m|pk,m) the single letter
mutual information across the legitimate channel at slot m of
frame k, and the analogous for the eavesdropper channel by
IEk,m(pk,m) = limn→∞
1
n
I(Xnk,m;Z
n
k,m|pk,m).
A. Decodable codes ensemble characterization
As decodability is concerned, we have the following result:
Lemma 1. Let (Mˆ,Mˆe) be the message decoded by the
ǫ-joint typicality decoder over K frames, and let the er-
ror probability associated with a given HARQ code Cn be
Pe(Cn|p) = P[(M,Me) 6= (Mˆ,Mˆe)|Cn,p] for a given
channel realization p. For all K ′ ≤ K and M ′ ≤ M that
satisfy
K′∑
k=1
Rd,k +Rs <
K′−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
[
IBk,m(pk,m)− δ(ǫ)
]
+
K′∑
k=1
M ′∑
m=1
[
IBk,m(pk,m)− δ(ǫ)
]
,
(3)
with δ(ǫ) > 0, then for each and n there exists a δ′ǫ(n) such
that δ′ǫ(n) −−−−→
n→∞
0 for each ǫ, and
ECn [Pe(Cn|p)] ≤ δǫ(n) . (4)
Proof: See the Appendix.
B. Secrecy codes ensemble characterization
To deal with secrecy, we first denote the information leakage
of the first M ′ slots of the k-th frame to Eve when Alice uses
code Cn,k over channel realization pk as
L(Cn,k|pk,M
′) = I(M; {Znk,1, . . . , Z
n
k,M ′}|Cn,k, pk). (5)
Similarly, the information leakage for the transmission up to
slot M ′ of frame K ′ is defined as
L(Cn|p,M
′,K ′) =
I(M;ZnM1 , . . . , Z
nM
K′−1, {Z
n
K′,1, . . . , Z
n
K′,M ′}|Cn,p).
(6)
Then we start with the following lemma that establishes a
relation between the information leakage of each frame and
that of the transmission up to frame K ′.
Lemma 2. The information leakage over all frames up to slot
M ′ of frame K ′ is not larger than the sum of information
leakage for each frame, i.e.,
L(Cn|p,M
′,K ′) ≤
K′−1∑
k=1
L(Cn,k|pk,M)+L(Cn,K′ |pK′ ,M
′) .
Proof: For the sake of a simpler notation we provide the
proof for K ′ = K and M ′ = M , the generalization being
straightforward.
Since we use independent random binning in each trans-
mission, (ZnM1 , . . . , ZnMk−1, Cn) → (Cn,k,M) → ZnMk is a
Markov chain.
By the chain rule for mutual information [11, eq. (2.62)]
we have
I(M;ZnM1 , . . . , Z
nM
K |Cn,p) =
K∑
k=1
I(M;ZnMk |Z
nM
1 , . . . , Z
nM
k−1, Cn, pk)
(7)
Each term in the sum can be upper bounded as
I(M;ZnMk |Z
nM
1 , . . . , Z
nM
k−1, Cn, pk) =
= H(ZnMk |Z
nM
1 , . . . , Z
nM
k−1, Cn, pk)−
−H(ZnMk |M, Z
nM
1 , . . . , Z
nM
k−1, Cn, pk)
≤ H(ZnMk |M, Cn,k, pk)−
−H(ZnMk |M, Z
nM
1 , . . . , Z
nM
k−1, Cn, pk)
= H(ZnMk |Cn,k, pk)−H(Z
nM
k |M, Cn,k, pk)
= I(M;ZnMk |Cn,k, pk) = L(Cn,k|pk,M) .
(8)
Then we derive a bound on the information leakage at the
k-th frame by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For each channel realization p and (K ′, M ′) such
that
∑M
m=1 I(X
n
k,m;Z
n
k,m|pk,m) < Rd,k, k = 1, . . . ,K
′ − 1,∑M ′
m=1 I(X
n
K′,m;Z
n
K′,m|pK′,m) < Rd,K′ , and for each n and
ǫ we have a δ(ǫ) and a δǫ(n) such that δǫ(n) −−−−→
n→∞
0 and
ECn,k
[
1
n
L(Cn,k|pk,M)
]
≤ δ(ǫ)+δǫ(n) , k = 1, . . . ,K
′−1
ECn,K′
[
1
n
L(Cn,K′ |pK′ ,M
′)
]
≤ δ(ǫ) + δǫ(n) .
Proof: See the wiretap coding theorem [4, pg. 72].
By combining the two results we obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. For each channel realization p and (K ′, M ′) such
that
M∑
m=1
IEk,m(pk,m) < Rd,k ∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
′ − 1
M ′∑
m=1
IEK,m(pK′,m) < Rd,K′
(9)
and for each n, we have a δ(ǫ) and a δǫ(n) such that
δǫ(n) −−−−→
n→∞
0 and
ECn
[
1
n
L(Cn|p,M
′,K ′)
]
≤ K ′δ(ǫ) +K ′δǫ(n) . (10)
Proof: Follows from Lemmas 3 and 2.
C. Characterization of the set P
Having derived sufficient conditions for decodability and
secrecy for given channel realizations we are now ready to
derive conditions for both decodability and secrecy with the
same code. We now show that for the set
P = {p : ∃(K ′,M ′) for which both (3) and (9) hold} (11)
there exists a single code (sequence) that provides both secrecy
and decodability.
Theorem 1. For all n there exists a specific code C∗n with
rates Rs and {Rd,k} such that, for all channels p ∈ P there
exists K ′(p) and M ′(p) such that
Pe(C
∗
n|p) ≤ δǫ(n) , L(C
∗
n|p,M
′(p),K ′(p)) ≤ δ(ǫ)+Kδǫ(n)
(12)
and
lim
n→∞
Pe(C
∗
n|p) = 0 , lim
n→∞
1
n
L(C∗n|p) ≤ δ(ǫ) . (13)
Proof: From the definition of P and lemma 3 we imme-
diately have
Ep∈P [ECn [Pe(Cn|p)]] ≤ δǫ(n) , (14)
while from Lemma 4 (and by the fact that K ′(p) < K) we
also have
Ep∈P
[
ECn
[
1
n
L(Cn|p,M
′(p),K ′(p))
]]
≤ Kδ(ǫ)+Kδǫ(n) .
(15)
Then, similarly to the approach of [7] we can swap the
expectations over the channel set and the codes (since the
integrands are non negative and finite), obtaining
ECn [Ep∈P [Pe(Cn|p)]] ≤ δǫ(n) (16)
ECn
[
Ep∈P
[
1
n
L(Cn|p,M
′(p),K ′(p))
]]
≤ Kδ(ǫ)+Kδǫ(n) .
(17)
Now by applying the selection lemma [4, pg. 14] to both
functions Pe(·) and L(·), with reference to the random variable
Cn, we obtain a sequence of codes with vanishing error
probability and leakage. By observing that both Pe(·) and L(·)
are non negative, we obtain (12) and (13).
We then have a single code sequence that provides both
decodability and secrecy for all channels in the set P .
Remark 1: this result generalizes that of [7]: for that
code construction in fact, sufficient conditions for secrecy were
ensured by a constraint on the sum of the mutual information
between Alice and Eve across slots of a single frame. In our
scenario instead we need bounds on each frame separately, as
indicated by (9).
V. SECURE CHANNEL SETS
Since the set P is defined in terms of the mutual information
of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels, we can equivalently
describe it by the set of mutual informations satisfying the
constraints, i.e., by the set
Q = {{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} :
p ∈ P , and IBk,m = IBk,m(pk,m) , IEk,m = IEk,m(pk,m)} .
(18)
From the results of the previous Section we have
Q =
K⋃
K′=1
M⋃
M ′=1
[
Q
(E)
S (K
′,M ′) ∩ Q
(B)
S (K
′,M ′)
]
, (19)
where Q(E)S (K ′,M ′) indicates the set of channels for which
no information about the secret message has leaked to Eve up
to the m-th slot of the k-th frame,
Q
(E)
S (K
′,M ′) =
{
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} :
M∑
m′=1
IEk′,m′ ≤ Rd,k′ , for k′ = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 1 ,
M ′∑
m′=1
IEK′,m′ ≤ Rd,K′

 (20)
while Q(B)S (K ′,M ′) indicates the set of channels for which
the secret message is decodable by Bob within the m-th slot
of the k-th frame,
Q
(B)
S (K
′,M ′) =
{
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} :
K′−1∑
k′=1
[
M∑
m′=1
IBk′,m′ −Rd,k′
]+
+

 M ′∑
m′=1
IBK′,m′ −Rd,K′


+
≥ Rs

 (21)
where [x]+ = 0 if x < 0 and [x]+ = x if x > 0. Condition
(21) follows by applying Lemma 3 to the Alice-Bob channel,
as we observe that if
∑M
m=1 I
B
k,m ≤ Rd,k, Bob will not make
use of the signal received in frame k to decode the secret
message.
I
(B)
1,1
I
(B)
2,1 = I
(B)
1,2
R12s
R12s
RIRd
RIRd
Rd,2 +Rs
Rd,1 +Rs
Fig. 2. R12s = Rd,1 + Rd,2 + Rs Bob’s decoding region Q
(B)
S
(2, 1)
for S-HARQ with K = 2 and M = 1 (dashed area), and Q(B)
S
(1, 2) of
IR-HARQ (gray area).
A. Outage Analysis
A bound on the reliability outage probability for the whole
transmission is then
Po ≤ P
[
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} 6∈ Q
(B)(K,M)
]
, (22)
while the probability that decoding happens exactly at the m-
the slot of the k-th frame is bounded as
PD(k,m) ≥

P
[
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} ∈ Q
(B)(k,m) \ Q(B)(k,m− 1)
]
m > 1
P
[
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} ∈ Q
(B)(k, 1) \ Q(B)(k − 1,M)
]
m = 1
.
(23)
Assuming that the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels are
independent, the secrecy outage probability up to slot m of
frame k is bounded by
Ps(k,m) ≤ P
[
{IBk,m, I
E
k,m} 6∈ Q
(E)(k,m)
]
. (24)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first provide some insight into the performance of the
proposed solution by considering a transmission with only two
frames K = 2 and one slot per frame M = 1. For given values
of Rd,1, Rd,2 and Rs, Fig. 2 shows as a dashed area the set
Q
(B)
S (2, 1) with K = 2 and M = 1. We also show in gray
the set Q(B)S (1, 2) with K = 1 frame and M = 2 slot, that is
when the IR-HARQ scheme is used with a random rate RIRd
over the same channel. We observe that the shape of the two
areas are different. Similarly, for given values of Rd,1, Rd,2
and Rs, Fig. 3 shows as a dashed area the set Q(E)S (2, 1) with
K = 2 and M = 1. We also show in gray the performance
of IR-HARQ. Also in this case we observe that the shape of
the two areas are different. We conclude that S-HARQ is a
non-trivial extension of IR-HARQ.
In order to further confirm this conclusion in a more general
setting, we have considered S-HARQ with a total of 6 slots.
I
(E)
1,1
I
(E)
2,1 = I
(E)
1,2
RIRd
RIRd
Rd,2
Rd,1
Fig. 3. Eve’s failure region Q(E)
S
(2, 1) for S-HARQ with K = 2 and
M = 1 (dashed area) and Q(B)
S
(1, 2) of IR-HARQ (gray area).
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Fig. 4. CDF of the difference between the throughputs of S-HARQ and
IR-HARQ for various values of M , over a Rice fading wiretap channel.
Both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels are block-fading, with
independent Rice channels at each slot: the Rice factor is 0 dB
for both and the average signal to noise ratio (SNR) is 4 dB for
the Alice-Bob channel and 5 dB, for the Alice-Eve channel.
The performance of the proposed approach is assessed over
block fading channels, by considering the achievable secret
throughput, i.e.
T = max
{Rd,k}
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
PD(k,m)[1− Ps(k,m)]Rs
M(k − 1) +m
, (25)
which is the average (over the number of slots) of the secrecy
rate divided by the number of slots needed for detection. As a
reference value we consider the achievable secret throughput
of the IR-HARQ scheme T (IR) and we focus on the additional
secret throughput defined as ∆T = T (S) − T (IR). Using (22),
(23) and (24) with equalities in (25) we obtain a lower bound
on the achievable secret throughput. Note that we resort to
the bounds since as exact performance is not known, although
the difference of the lower bounds ∆T may not in general
be a bound of the actual difference. For various values of
M , Fig. 4 shows the CDF of ∆T . Moreover, the total of 6
slots can be split into the following frame configurations: a)
K = 1, M = 6, b) K = 2, M = 3, c) K = 3, M = 2, d)
K = 6, M = 1. Recall that K = 1,M = 6 corresponds to
the IR-HARQ system. From the figure, we note that for all
M < 6, we have ∆T > 0 with non-zero probability, therefore
there are cases when the diversity provided by different frames
within the same total number of slots, yields a strictly higher
throughput than choosing K = 1. Moreover, we observe that
by varying M the distribution of ∆T changes, thus leaving
space for optimization of the system, to be considered in future
studies.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a secret message transmission scheme
over block fading channels with a feedback from the legitimate
receiver with no CSI. Numerical results have highlighted the
non-trivial relation with existing schemes and the fact that
for some channel conditions the proposed solution provides a
higher available secret throughput.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix we provide the proof of Lemma 1.
For the sake of a simpler notation we provide the proof
for K ′ = K and M ′ = M , the generalization being
straightforward.
Without restriction we suppose M = i = 1. Indicating with
T nMK,ǫ (XkYk) the set of all ǫ-jointly weakly typical sequences
({XMn1 (i, j1), . . . , X
Mn
K (i, jk)}, {Y
Mn
1 , . . . , Y
Mn
K }), we can
express ECn [Pe(Cn|p)] in terms of the events
Ei,j1,...,jK = { ({X
nM
k (i, jk)}, {Y
nM
k }) ∈ T
nM
K,ǫ (XkYk) }
(26)
for (i, j1, . . . , jK) ∈ [1, 2nRs ]× [1, 2nRd,k ]× · · · × [1, 2nRd,k ]
as
ECn [Pe(Cn|p)] = P
[
Ec1,1,...,1∪
⋃
(1,j1,...,jK):{∃k:jk 6=1}
Ei,j1,...,jK ∪
⋃
(i,j1,...,jK):i6=1
Ei,j1,...,jK


(27)
By the asymptotic equipartition property we have
P
[
Ec1,1,...,1
]
≤ δǫ(n) . (28)
Indicating with with T nMǫ (XkYk) the set of all ǫ-jointly
weakly typical sequences (XMnk (i, jk), YMnk ), define the
event
Fi,j,k = {(X
nM
k (i, j), Y
nM
k ) ∈ T
nM
ǫ (XkYk)} (29)
for (i, j, k) ∈ [1, 2nRs ]× [1, 2nRd,k ]× [1,K], then we have
P [Ei,j1,...,jK ] =
∏
k
P [Fi,jk,k] . (30)
We can split
⋃
(1,j1,...,jK):{∃k:jk 6=1}
Ei,j1,...,jK as the union
of the events where an error occurs in at least one frame. Let
S be the set of k for which error occurs, then we have
P
[
Ei,jk 6=1,k∈S ,ju=1,u∈K\S
]
≤ 2−n(
∑
k∈S
I(XMnk ;Y
Mn
k |pk)−δ(ǫ))
(31)
with K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and we have 2nRd,k|S| − 1 of
these events. Hence, the most restrictive condition on Rd,k
to have vanishing error probability is when only one of the K
messages is different from 1 and in this case we have
P [E1,j1,...,jK ] ≤ 2
−n(I(XnMk ;Y
nM
k |pk)−δ(ǫ)) , ∃!k : jk 6= 1
(32)
and we have 2nRd,k − 1 of such events.
Event Ei,j1,...,jK , i 6= 1 occurs when Fi,j,k, i 6= 1 occurs
for all k, in which case from (30) we have
P [E1,j1,...,jK ] ≤ 2
−n(
∑K
k=1
I(XnMk ;Y
nM
k |pk)−δ(ǫ)) , ∃!k : jk 6= 1
(33)
and we have (2nRs − 1)2
∑
K
k=1 Rd,k of such events.
From (27) we have
ECn [Pe(Cn|p)] ≤
δǫ(n) +
K∑
k=1
(2nRd,k − 1)2−n(I(X
nM
k ;Z
nM
k |pk)−δ(ǫ))+
2
∑K
k=1
Rd,k(2nRs − 1)2−n
∑K
k=1
(I(XnMk ;Y
nM
k |pk)−δ(ǫ)) .
Lastly, observing that
I(XnMk ;Y
nM
k |pk) =
M∑
m=1
I(Xnk,m;Y
n
k,m|pk,m) , (34)
we conclude the proof.
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